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Alternatives to Truthfulness are Hard to Recognize 1-gen-2008 Auletta, Vincenzo; Penna, Paolo; Persiano, Giuseppe; Ventre, Carmine
On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers 1-gen-2009 Briest, P; Hoefer, M; Gualà, L; Ventre, Carmine
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification 1-gen-2009 Penna, P; Ventre, Carmine
On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers 1-gen-2009 Briest, P; Hoefer, M; Gualà, L; Ventre, Carmine
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification 1-gen-2009 Penna, P; Ventre, Carmine
Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multi- Objective Optimization 1-gen-2010 Grandoni, F; Krysta, P; Leonardi, S; Ventre, Carmine
Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games 1-gen-2016 Ferraioli, Diodato; Goldberg, Paul W.; Ventre, Carmine
What to Verify for Optimal Truthful Mechanisms without Money 1-gen-2016 Ferraioli, Diodato; Serafino, Paolo; Ventre, Carmine
Social Pressure in Opinion Games 1-gen-2017 Ferraioli, Diodato; Ventre, Carmine
Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations (extended abstract) 1-gen-2017 Ferraioli, Diodato; Ventre, Carmine
Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations 1-gen-2017 Ferraioli, Diodato; Ventre, Carmine
Probabilistic verification for obviously strategyproof mechanisms 1-gen-2018 Ferraioli, Diodato; Ventre, Carmine
Probabilistic verification for Obviously strategyproof mechanisms 1-gen-2018 Ferraioli, Diodato; Ventre, Carmine
Metastability of the logit dynamics for asymptotically well-behaved potential games 1-gen-2019 Ferraioli, Diodato; Ventre, Carmine
Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set Systems: The Case of Small Domains 1-gen-2019 Ferraioli, D.; Meier, A; Penna, P.; Ventre, C.
Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation 1-gen-2019 Ferraioli, Diodato; Ventre, Carmine
Obviously strategyproof mechanisms for machine scheduling 1-gen-2019 Ferraioli, D.; Meier, A.; Penna, P.; Ventre, C.
Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation: The Case of Machine Scheduling 1-gen-2019 Ferraioli, D.; Ventre, C.
Social pressure in opinion dynamics 1-gen-2019 Ferraioli, D.; Ventre, C.
Novel paradigm for the design of obviously strategyproof mechanisms 1-gen-2020 Ferraioli, D.; Meier, A.; Penna, P.; Ventre, C.
Mostrati risultati da 1 a 20 di 27
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