We study international trade in innovative goods subject to uncertain consumer health effects. Such goods are often at the center of international trade disputes. We show that an interesting form of protectionism may arise because ofscientifc uncertainty. A free-riding effect is identi1ed, implying more conservative behavior by countries. We also study the role of producers (lobbies) in providing valuable information, finding that the innovative lobby has an advantage in providing information as compared with the lobby producing the ‘traditional’ good. Moreover, lobbies disclose more information when the health effects are long lasting.
Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade
IMMORDINO, Giovanni;
2005-01-01
Abstract
We study international trade in innovative goods subject to uncertain consumer health effects. Such goods are often at the center of international trade disputes. We show that an interesting form of protectionism may arise because ofscientifc uncertainty. A free-riding effect is identi1ed, implying more conservative behavior by countries. We also study the role of producers (lobbies) in providing valuable information, finding that the innovative lobby has an advantage in providing information as compared with the lobby producing the ‘traditional’ good. Moreover, lobbies disclose more information when the health effects are long lasting.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
