We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], we study a setting with restrictions on the domain, while still preserving multi-dimensionality. In a sense, our setting is the simplest multi-dimensional setting, where each machine holds privately only a single-bit of information. We prove a separation between truthful-in-expectation and universally truthful mechanisms for makespan minimization: We first show how to design an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and then prove lower bounds on the approximation guarantee of universally truthful mechanisms.

Mechanisms for Scheduling with Single-Bit Private Values

AULETTA, Vincenzo;PENNA, Paolo
2012-01-01

Abstract

We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], we study a setting with restrictions on the domain, while still preserving multi-dimensionality. In a sense, our setting is the simplest multi-dimensional setting, where each machine holds privately only a single-bit of information. We prove a separation between truthful-in-expectation and universally truthful mechanisms for makespan minimization: We first show how to design an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and then prove lower bounds on the approximation guarantee of universally truthful mechanisms.
2012
9783642339950
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11386/3879664
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