In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a social norm by an uninvolved observer - or third party - whose payoff is unaffected by the behavior of the same agent. In our research, we attempt to improve the understanding of Third Party punishment by reproducing an experiment conducted by Fehr et al. 2004 (TP-PD) with a sample of Camorra prison inmates. We then compare the decisions of the Camorra inmates with the behavior of university students with similar social and economic backgrounds. Our primary conclusion is that there are significant differences in cooperative and sanctioning behavior. Keywords: Camorra, prison inmates, social values, social norms, sanction, punishment, reciprocity, social preference, third party, normative criteria, laboratory experiment.
Third party punishment and criminal behavior: an experiment with Italian camorra inmates
NESE, Annamaria;
2012-01-01
Abstract
In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a social norm by an uninvolved observer - or third party - whose payoff is unaffected by the behavior of the same agent. In our research, we attempt to improve the understanding of Third Party punishment by reproducing an experiment conducted by Fehr et al. 2004 (TP-PD) with a sample of Camorra prison inmates. We then compare the decisions of the Camorra inmates with the behavior of university students with similar social and economic backgrounds. Our primary conclusion is that there are significant differences in cooperative and sanctioning behavior. Keywords: Camorra, prison inmates, social values, social norms, sanction, punishment, reciprocity, social preference, third party, normative criteria, laboratory experiment.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
