It is well known that in a differential information economy the free coalition formation may imply some theoretical difficulties. It does not suffice to say that a coalition can be formed by several agents. We define a set of all possible coalitions as the set of those coalitions that can be formed and joint by any agent. There exists, in this way, a rule imposed over coalition formation. We assume that only a subset $\mathcal{S}$ of $\Sigma$ is alowed to form. In such way, we fix over the set of agents an aggregation rule for which the coalitions can be formed only if they belong to this subset. We have restricted the set of coalitions that can be joined by traders. The main result is the equivalence between two private core concept: the classical one for a differential information economy and the private core \emph{restricted}.
A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results
BIMONTE, GIOVANNA
2013
Abstract
It is well known that in a differential information economy the free coalition formation may imply some theoretical difficulties. It does not suffice to say that a coalition can be formed by several agents. We define a set of all possible coalitions as the set of those coalitions that can be formed and joint by any agent. There exists, in this way, a rule imposed over coalition formation. We assume that only a subset $\mathcal{S}$ of $\Sigma$ is alowed to form. In such way, we fix over the set of agents an aggregation rule for which the coalitions can be formed only if they belong to this subset. We have restricted the set of coalitions that can be joined by traders. The main result is the equivalence between two private core concept: the classical one for a differential information economy and the private core \emph{restricted}.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
