In this paper we propose an alternative way to build a new environmen- tal agreement after the deadline of the Kyoto Protocol. Considering the many lacks of the previous international environmental agreements we build a cooperative game with Non Transferable Utility (NTU). Two or more countries are considered to form a coalition if they sign a multilateral environmental agreement. We show that it is possible to find a self-generating system corresponding to the formation of a stable grand coalition on the aim to induce an ecient environmental agreement. The con- vexity and positive externalities imply the eciency of the grand coalition. In other words, convexity implies that a coalition can achieve at least as much as what its part can achieve.

Environmental Agreement and NTU game in partition function form

BARRA, CRISTIAN;BIMONTE, GIOVANNA;SENATORE, Luigi
2016-01-01

Abstract

In this paper we propose an alternative way to build a new environmen- tal agreement after the deadline of the Kyoto Protocol. Considering the many lacks of the previous international environmental agreements we build a cooperative game with Non Transferable Utility (NTU). Two or more countries are considered to form a coalition if they sign a multilateral environmental agreement. We show that it is possible to find a self-generating system corresponding to the formation of a stable grand coalition on the aim to induce an ecient environmental agreement. The con- vexity and positive externalities imply the eciency of the grand coalition. In other words, convexity implies that a coalition can achieve at least as much as what its part can achieve.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11386/4677405
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