Illegal Behavior in the Public Administration

This analysis addresses the corruption of Italian mayors, and it is carried out by analyzing the sentences of the Italian Supreme Court in the last decade. The research questions are as follows: Is corruption effectively prosecuted and punished in Italy? Are there signs of social stigma or reputational damage for corrupt politicians? To this aim, we focus on i) justice efficiency and ii) social tolerance of corruption. The results reported here reveal that the probability of re-election increases in small urban areas, when the mayor is a strong leader and when he colludes with entrepreneurs external to the council, thus reinforcing the hypotheses that people vote for corrupt leaders because they receive favors from those leaders or because they perceive that those leaders are efficient in delivering public goods. The judicial system works well against organized crime, probably because of the special proceedings against "mafiosi"; however, it is more inefficient when a mayor colludes with his staff: evidently, higher efficiency may be pursued through the implementation of a stricter legal institutional framework