Informality has been a central concern for political enquiry since classical antiquity. Plato, Aristotle and many others were interested in education, military training, and the arts not just in and of themselves, but because, however perfect a city-state’s constitution might be, they could remain intact only if citizens’ conduct was righteous. In classical Islamic political philosophy also, the link between the quintessential informal quality of morality and political behaviour is a longstanding concern, as Ibn Khaldoun’s concern with asabiyya epitomises. From Machiavelli to Marx, Foucault to Agamben, the awareness of the importance of individual agency beyond the bounds and bonds of formal institutions – whether under the guise of ‘morality’, ‘subjectivation’, or ‘decision’ – has never left the horizon of political enquiry. Times when rapid and profound change becomes possible, and new legal-political orders may be forged, are one context in which the formal ‘rules of the game’ become less important than the informal sphere of motivations and decisions. In this sense, to focus on the relationship between formal and informal involves nothing less than inquiring into the relationship between constitutive and constituted power. Understanding this relationship is particularly crucial as it is the inversion of the ‘normal’ balance between formal and informal that marks out the transition from ‘ordinary’ politics to the exceptional. Certainly, understanding political dynamics entails a focus beyond the state and the official public sphere of party politics (Fukui 2000). Drawing on Isaacs (2011) Anceschi points out that if we are to observe in isolation either side of the formal/informal divide, we risk failing to capture ‘the dynamic that occurs between both forms of politics’. Studies in this volume investigate this organic relation along three major axes. First, the informal manipulation of formal structures, such as Guida’s analysis of political proxies, Bacik’s description of emenetcilik, or Anceschi’s focus on the ‘informalization’ of Khazak constitutional procedures. Secondly, the formal manipulation of informal structures: Bassil’s historical tracing of the British (re)invention of tribalism in Darfur, and again Anceschi’s description of how informal patterns of rule are re-made through institutional channels – ironically, using rule of law as a rubric under which to affect such changes – which is eminently recognisable in so many Middle Eastern but also European contexts. Thirdly, the question of the line between regime and alternative, and between formal and informal is posed in different ways, in the difficult choices facing progressive civil society in Morocco noted by Dalmasso, or by Gervasio in Egypt. These studies show that the demarcation between formal and informal and the line of causality not be simplified to a single chain of causality. They also make clear that the forces that organise politics themselves operate through an articulation of the relationship between formal and informal. A long line of studies, from Nietszche to Foucault to Mitchell, have noted that there are political implications to imaging administration and scholarship itself in certain ways and not others. In positivist scholarship, the conceptual categories and analytical tools scholars and policymakers deploy to interpret the world are supposed to work like the formal institutional realm, and kind of ‘constitution’ of the political. Yet, as Aristotle or Ibn Khaldoun would readily recognise, that formal structure can only operate insofar as there are arbitrary, informal mores to sustain it. It is this dimension of academic analytical frameworks as not merely describing but as intertwined with the process of imagining and bringing about the political that this contribution takes as its subject. To do this, it is important to analyse the scholarship on authoritarianism and democratization, investigating its reliance on certain categorisations which, like the category of ‘tribes’ in Bassil’s study, are themselves involved in generating, rather than merely reflecting, political practices. This chapter examines the theoretical construction of one of the founding dichotomies in the taxonomy underpinning post-war political science: ‘democracy’ and ‘authoritarianism’. Since for both political agents such as states and for scholars, ‘civil society’ is central to the conceptual architecture which has arisen around the idea of (liberal) democracy, and to its attendant politics, this contribution explores traits of this conceptual architecture and outlines some of its practical political implications.
Disciplinary Politics of Civil Society and Democracy
Teti G
2014-01-01
Abstract
Informality has been a central concern for political enquiry since classical antiquity. Plato, Aristotle and many others were interested in education, military training, and the arts not just in and of themselves, but because, however perfect a city-state’s constitution might be, they could remain intact only if citizens’ conduct was righteous. In classical Islamic political philosophy also, the link between the quintessential informal quality of morality and political behaviour is a longstanding concern, as Ibn Khaldoun’s concern with asabiyya epitomises. From Machiavelli to Marx, Foucault to Agamben, the awareness of the importance of individual agency beyond the bounds and bonds of formal institutions – whether under the guise of ‘morality’, ‘subjectivation’, or ‘decision’ – has never left the horizon of political enquiry. Times when rapid and profound change becomes possible, and new legal-political orders may be forged, are one context in which the formal ‘rules of the game’ become less important than the informal sphere of motivations and decisions. In this sense, to focus on the relationship between formal and informal involves nothing less than inquiring into the relationship between constitutive and constituted power. Understanding this relationship is particularly crucial as it is the inversion of the ‘normal’ balance between formal and informal that marks out the transition from ‘ordinary’ politics to the exceptional. Certainly, understanding political dynamics entails a focus beyond the state and the official public sphere of party politics (Fukui 2000). Drawing on Isaacs (2011) Anceschi points out that if we are to observe in isolation either side of the formal/informal divide, we risk failing to capture ‘the dynamic that occurs between both forms of politics’. Studies in this volume investigate this organic relation along three major axes. First, the informal manipulation of formal structures, such as Guida’s analysis of political proxies, Bacik’s description of emenetcilik, or Anceschi’s focus on the ‘informalization’ of Khazak constitutional procedures. Secondly, the formal manipulation of informal structures: Bassil’s historical tracing of the British (re)invention of tribalism in Darfur, and again Anceschi’s description of how informal patterns of rule are re-made through institutional channels – ironically, using rule of law as a rubric under which to affect such changes – which is eminently recognisable in so many Middle Eastern but also European contexts. Thirdly, the question of the line between regime and alternative, and between formal and informal is posed in different ways, in the difficult choices facing progressive civil society in Morocco noted by Dalmasso, or by Gervasio in Egypt. These studies show that the demarcation between formal and informal and the line of causality not be simplified to a single chain of causality. They also make clear that the forces that organise politics themselves operate through an articulation of the relationship between formal and informal. A long line of studies, from Nietszche to Foucault to Mitchell, have noted that there are political implications to imaging administration and scholarship itself in certain ways and not others. In positivist scholarship, the conceptual categories and analytical tools scholars and policymakers deploy to interpret the world are supposed to work like the formal institutional realm, and kind of ‘constitution’ of the political. Yet, as Aristotle or Ibn Khaldoun would readily recognise, that formal structure can only operate insofar as there are arbitrary, informal mores to sustain it. It is this dimension of academic analytical frameworks as not merely describing but as intertwined with the process of imagining and bringing about the political that this contribution takes as its subject. To do this, it is important to analyse the scholarship on authoritarianism and democratization, investigating its reliance on certain categorisations which, like the category of ‘tribes’ in Bassil’s study, are themselves involved in generating, rather than merely reflecting, political practices. This chapter examines the theoretical construction of one of the founding dichotomies in the taxonomy underpinning post-war political science: ‘democracy’ and ‘authoritarianism’. Since for both political agents such as states and for scholars, ‘civil society’ is central to the conceptual architecture which has arisen around the idea of (liberal) democracy, and to its attendant politics, this contribution explores traits of this conceptual architecture and outlines some of its practical political implications.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
