E' possibile una teoria morale senza i concetti di responsabilità e colpa?

This paper summarizes some aspects of contemporary discussion on the theme of determinism and free will, dwelling particularly on some contemporary authors who, considering free will as an illusion ad criticizing philosophically the concept of moral responsibility, desert and guilt, are attempting to build a conception of morality consistent with this "hard determinist" point of view (T. Honderich, G. Strawson, D. Pereboom). If some of the implications of these "hard" views are obvious enough, and independently sustainable - for instance the criticism of retributive grounds of criminal law and the same notion of punishment - others are more questionable: for instance all that concerns the kind of moral feeling that could arise from the acquisition of a "hard" point of view. In this last case, "hard" theories seem at the moment more an interesting mental experiment than a real option.