This paper evaluates the possible effects of advertising on conditions of entry in a market with one incumbent and one potential entrant. Through a game-theoretic framework, it is shown that the use of pre-entry advertising expenditures (which are supposed to exhibit diminishing returns) may discourage entry even when firms behave rationally and face the same conditions of cost and demand.
Strategic advertising for entry deterrence purposes
COCCORESE, Paolo
2001-01-01
Abstract
This paper evaluates the possible effects of advertising on conditions of entry in a market with one incumbent and one potential entrant. Through a game-theoretic framework, it is shown that the use of pre-entry advertising expenditures (which are supposed to exhibit diminishing returns) may discourage entry even when firms behave rationally and face the same conditions of cost and demand.File in questo prodotto:
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