Further expanding an analysis previously made by the same author, this essay addresses the nine months of Mussolini’s «non-belligerency» and adds new evidence on the factors that inflenced Mussolini’s decision to join Hitler in the war on 10 June 1940. In particular, the article provides an insight into the efforts made by Mussolini to differentiate his position from that of Germany and to validate himself as a reliable mediator for peace negotiations. Having failed to achieve this during the fist half of the non-belligerency, Mussolini apparently reverted to a policy of solidarity with Berlin. Then, as defeat loomed for the Allies, Mussolini’s pressure increased along with German successes until he thought of the declaration of war as a last resort to embolden the peacemakers in Paris and London and to bring them to the peace table to save what remained of the European balance.
Speak of War and Prepare for Peace: Rome, 10 June 1940.
GIN, Emilio
2014
Abstract
Further expanding an analysis previously made by the same author, this essay addresses the nine months of Mussolini’s «non-belligerency» and adds new evidence on the factors that inflenced Mussolini’s decision to join Hitler in the war on 10 June 1940. In particular, the article provides an insight into the efforts made by Mussolini to differentiate his position from that of Germany and to validate himself as a reliable mediator for peace negotiations. Having failed to achieve this during the fist half of the non-belligerency, Mussolini apparently reverted to a policy of solidarity with Berlin. Then, as defeat loomed for the Allies, Mussolini’s pressure increased along with German successes until he thought of the declaration of war as a last resort to embolden the peacemakers in Paris and London and to bring them to the peace table to save what remained of the European balance.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
