Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats

When are strategic appointments useful in curbing policy bias from ex-post negotiation between state agencies and special interest groups? Bertelli and Feldmann (J Public Adm Res Theory 17:19–38, 2007) provide an insightful analysis of the issue within a full information model of presidential appointments. This paper examines whether and how their findings extend to a world of policy uncertainty and asymmetric information, which rationalizes delegation in the first place. We establish that the occurrence of policy-relevant equilibrium lobbying crucially relies on interest groups’ leverage over the appointment game between higher-level institutions. Remarkably, bureaucratic lobbying may prove highly non-neutral with separated powers even when a candidate agency is agreed upon. In some circumstances (e.g., recess appointments in the US), by contrast, strategic appointments fully offset interest group influence in either form of government (unified versus divided), a finding in line with the conventional theory of delegation.