This article addresses the tax progressivity decision of a rent-maximising government under the circumstances that voters’ perceptions of the tax price of public goods are biased by cognitive anomalies (i.e. fiscal illusion) and that the electorate opts for reappointing or for dismissing the incumbent according to a retrospective voting logic. Given electoral and constitutional constraints, we show that the design of the tax system can be sensibly affected by fiscal illusion within the population of voters. Specifically, we find that (i) the tax system is more (less) progressive when taxes and public expenditures are perceived less (more), and (ii) an increase in the median voter’s income may positively or negatively affect tax progressivity depending on the nature (pessimistic or optimistic) of fiscal illusion. The impact of fiscal illusion on tax progressivity has been validated by econometric analysis.

Fiscal Illusion and Progressive Taxation with Retrospective Voting

Antonio ABATEMARCO
;
Roberto DELL'ANNO
2020-01-01

Abstract

This article addresses the tax progressivity decision of a rent-maximising government under the circumstances that voters’ perceptions of the tax price of public goods are biased by cognitive anomalies (i.e. fiscal illusion) and that the electorate opts for reappointing or for dismissing the incumbent according to a retrospective voting logic. Given electoral and constitutional constraints, we show that the design of the tax system can be sensibly affected by fiscal illusion within the population of voters. Specifically, we find that (i) the tax system is more (less) progressive when taxes and public expenditures are perceived less (more), and (ii) an increase in the median voter’s income may positively or negatively affect tax progressivity depending on the nature (pessimistic or optimistic) of fiscal illusion. The impact of fiscal illusion on tax progressivity has been validated by econometric analysis.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11386/4734472
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 1
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 1
social impact