Evaluation of strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

The study aims to assess the effectiveness and adaptability of both classical and contemporary strategies. It further explores the implications of strategic diversity and complexity on cooperation and stability within IPD tournaments. Methods: Strategy tournaments were conducted with an extensive pool of participants, including main Axelrod? original strategies (Tit for Tat, Always Defect, etc.) and modern strategies. Simulations were performed using custom-built software tested. The study examined tournaments where strategies remain fixed throughout, by varying the set of participants and using different payoff matrices. Matches were played with both fixed and variable durations, and in this case the average enrichment for each strategy was considered. Results: The analysis revealed that Tit for Tat is not the sole dominant strategy. Different levels of strategic complexity and cooperation/defection often led to different winners, especially in environments with a strong Cooperation or Defection connotation. The impact of payoff structures was significant, with even small adjustments shifting the balance between cooperation and defection. Conclusion: The findings offer an updated perspective on the IPD, highlighting the evolving interplay between strategic design and environmental factors. The results have broader implications for policy-making, algorithm design, and the study of cooperative dynamics across economic, biological, and artificial systems. Future Directions: Future research could explore strategies developed through machine learning techniques and hybrid approaches combining memory and stochastic elements. Additional studies could simulate diverse environments by systematically varying payoff matrices and incorporating performance metrics such as robustness and adaptability. Furthermore, investigating strategies capable of modifying their behavior dynamically within matches would provide deeper insights into adaptive cooperation.