Necessità di Schelling

After a brief description of the difficult reception of Schelling’s thought in the 19th and 20th centuries, particularly through the early interpretations of Engels and Kierkegaard, the author presents Schelling’s late and final philosophical system, consisting of negative and positive philosophy, as a philosophy of liberty, an alternative to the dissolution of Hegelianism that had prevailed until then. Developing the interpretations of Tilliette and Pareyson, Tomatis identifies the 1839 Munich course (Einleitung in die Philosophie. Über die höchsten Principien) as the turning point in Schelling’s final phase of thought, particularly through the differentiation between the necessary being actu and the necessary being natura sua. Finally, he analyzes some of the key issues in Schelling’s thought that are relevant in contemporary philosophical debate: the search for a rational system open to liberty, through the amazement of reason, a non-objectifying philosophy of nature, a monotheism quia talis, capable of understanding other religious conceptions, an eschatological philosophy of history, and a philosophy of liberty.