Satellite communication contributes tremendously to the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) with telecommunication efficiency and data accessibility at global-scale coverage. However, realizing proactive defense for satellite communication remains a challenge. In order to address such an issue, we first explore state-of-the-art proactive defense methods and, following next, a step forward on proposing an end hopping scheme based on fixed hopping timeslot and strict time synchronization strategy by utilizing moving target defense (MTD). In addition, we worked on a Proof of Concept (PoC) to evaluate the scheme's theoretical protection performance for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Experimental evaluation and analysis of the proposed scheme show that it is efficient and secure, as seen when the attack rate is 100 times/s, the response time of the hopping state is 69.98% shorter than that of the normal state, and when the attack rate is 1000 times/s, the response time of the hopping state is 90.15% shorter.
Robust End Hopping for Secure Satellite Communication in Moving Target Defense
Castiglione, A
2022-01-01
Abstract
Satellite communication contributes tremendously to the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) with telecommunication efficiency and data accessibility at global-scale coverage. However, realizing proactive defense for satellite communication remains a challenge. In order to address such an issue, we first explore state-of-the-art proactive defense methods and, following next, a step forward on proposing an end hopping scheme based on fixed hopping timeslot and strict time synchronization strategy by utilizing moving target defense (MTD). In addition, we worked on a Proof of Concept (PoC) to evaluate the scheme's theoretical protection performance for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Experimental evaluation and analysis of the proposed scheme show that it is efficient and secure, as seen when the attack rate is 100 times/s, the response time of the hopping state is 69.98% shorter than that of the normal state, and when the attack rate is 1000 times/s, the response time of the hopping state is 90.15% shorter.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.