Gödel’s theory revolutionized mathematical logic. It is based on the assumption of the non-demonstrability of the axioms in a given closed logic system. From these premises this work aims to address the issue of the non-derivability/non-decidability of law as emerging from Hans Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre. Therefore we will offer a critical and problematic comparison between Gödel and Kelsen, considered as epigones of a certain epistemological formalism.

Logica del dover essere Gödel e Kelsen: un confronto possibile?

VALITUTTI D
2021

Abstract

Gödel’s theory revolutionized mathematical logic. It is based on the assumption of the non-demonstrability of the axioms in a given closed logic system. From these premises this work aims to address the issue of the non-derivability/non-decidability of law as emerging from Hans Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre. Therefore we will offer a critical and problematic comparison between Gödel and Kelsen, considered as epigones of a certain epistemological formalism.
2021
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11386/4949558
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